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Drafts of the Japanese Strict Product
Liability Code: Shall Japanese
Manufacturers Also Become the
Insurers of their Products?

Current Japanese product liability law is based primarily on negligence theory, rather than strict liability. Since around 1990, however,
there has been an outcry for the enactment of strict product liability law
in Japan.l As European Community (EC) countries enact strict product
liability laws, 2 the demand for a similar code is growing stronger in
3
Japan.
Plaintiff lawyers and consumer groups argue that without strict liability law, similar to laws in the EC and the United States, Japanese consumers do not always receive compensation when a defective product
causes injuries. 4 Consumer groups also fear that the relaxation of previously strict government safety standards 5 will permit defective goods to
enter the market, and consequently argue for increased consumer
1. Consumers Pressfor More Protection; Efforts Stepped up to Enact a Japanese Law on
Product Liability, NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN [JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL], Dec. 22, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter NIKKEI 12/22/90].
2. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liabilityfor Defective Products,
1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EEC Product Liability Directive 85/374 (EEC)) [hereinafter EC
Directive].
3. NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Henshuu Iinkai, Tokushzi7 Seizfbutsu Sekinin no Genj6to Kadai[Special Topics: Present Status and the Future Problems of Product Liability],41 Jiv-O TO SEIGI [FREEDOM AND
JUSTICE] (No. 10) 4 (1990). (Jiyu to Seigi is a magazine written injapanese for thejapan
Federation of Bar Associations. A copy of the issue listed here is available from the
author.)
The Japanese government lowered safety standards on products in response to
allegations by Western countries that Japan's strict safety standards amounted to a
non-tariff trade barrier. "[Ift has been estimated that over one-half of the non-tariff
barriers in Japan are related to health and safety standards and regulations." David
Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, JapaneseProduct Safety Regulation and International Trade, 19 U.B.C. L. REv. 315, 319 (1985) (footnote omitted).
The Western countries that have pressured Japan include the nations of the European Community and the United States. Keith Stafford, REUTERS, Feb. 4, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archiv File. See also Cohen & Martin, supra, at 351-55;
Peter B. Edelman, Japan's Product Standardsas Non-tariff Trade Barriers: When Regulatory
Policy Becomes a Trade Issue, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389, 390-91 (1988). For the Japanese
strict safety standards, see Cohen & Martin, supra, at 346-51.
25 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 643 (1992)
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protection.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has
opposed proposals to enact strict product liability law.7 The MITI
seems to consider product liability law similar to that in the U.S. undesirable. 8 Japanese manufacturers and insurance companies also oppose
strict liability law proposals. 9 Japanese industries reportedly fear that
"introduction of such a law would increase product costs and impair
their product development capability .... 10
Despite conflicting views on the need for a strict product liability
statute, several organizations-including the Group of 1990 Private Law
Academy, the Special Committee for Consumers' Problems of the
Tokyo Federation of Bar Associations, Shakai-t (the Japanese Socialist
Party), and the Japanese Kjmei-t6 Party-have prepared proposals for
reform.I l These proposals, aimed at protecting consumers, share sev6. See Iinkai, supra note 5, at 4.
7. NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1. See also NaderBlames Politicsfor Sheepish Consumers; Pessimism, Lack of a Forum and a 'Conspiracy of Silence' HinderJapaneseActivists, NIHON
KEIZAI SHINBUN, Nov. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter NIKKEI 11/17/90] ("[IThe Japan Federation of Bar Associations has suggested changes in product liability law that would make it easier for consumers to win
suits. However, the revisions are opposed by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry." (emphasis added))
8. "I don't think there is any great imperative for enacting such a law," explains
Yasuhumi Ozawa of MITI's Consumer Protection Division. "There are many other
ways to protect consumers against defective products than legislation like in the
U.S." JapaneseLack ProtectionAgainst Defective Products, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 17,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File) [hereinafter KYODO 10/17/90].
("A survey conducted by the Economic Planning Agency last year showed more than
half of majorJapanese makers dead set against such a [strict product liability] law.")
9. Id. See also Small- and Medium-Size Enterprises in Japan Unpreparedfor Planned
Product Liability Regulations, COMLINE NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter COMLINE 8/9/90]. ("The Japan branch of
AIU Insurance Co. of the United States, recently conducted a survey... targeted at
10,000 small- and medium-size manufacturers (with annual sales ranging from 100
million to 1 billion yen) in various industries. The survey [showed that] 74% did not
welcome enactment of such laws.")
10. NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1. See also JapaneseCar Sales in U.S. Not Linked to
Gulf War, KYODo NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Currnt File.
11. As of January 22, 1991, major proposals include: GROUP OF 1990 PRIVATE
LAW ACADEMY, SEIZ6BUTSU SEKININ RIPP6ENO TEIAN [PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION OF
PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW] (1990) [hereinafter GROUP OF 1990's DRAFT]; SPECIAL COMMIrEE FOR CONSUMERS' PROBLEMS, TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS,
SEIZ6BUTSU SEKININ H6 SHIAN [TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW]

(1989)

[hereinafter TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS' DRAFT]; SHAKAI-T6

[JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY], SEIZ6BUTSU SEKININ

H6

H6AN Y6K6 [PROPOSAL FOR AN

OUTLINE OF A PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW BILL] (1990), [hereinafter StAAi-T6 DRAFT]
(Shakai-t6, the Japanese Socialist Party is the leading opposition party in the Japanese Diet); K6MEI-T6 PARTY, SEIZ6BUTSU SEKININ H6AN Y6x6 [OUTLINE OF PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW BILL] (1990) [hereinafter K6MEI-T6 DRAFT] (the K6mei Party is the

second largest opposition party in the Japanese Diet). The author relied upon the
assistance of Legal Department of Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the collection of
these proposals. Japanese documents of these proposals are available from the
author and the legal department of Fuji Heavy Ind., Ltd.
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eral common elements: they eliminate negligence as an element necessary for recovery, shift the burden of proof for defects and causation
from plaintiffs to defendants, provide joint and several liability, and
allow the set-off of damages only when plaintiffs are grossly negligent. 12
In addition, the Tokyo Federation of Bar Associations Draft provides for
punitive damages, which are not recognized under traditional Japanese
3
law.'
This Note will examine the current proposals to reform Japan's
product liability law and will argue that reform of substantive law is not
the most effective means of compensating injured consumers. Section I
will describe current Japanese product liability law. Section II will
explain the major elements of the current proposals for reform. Section
III will explain why strict product liability law is inappropriate forJapan.
Section IV will critique the proposals and argue that they will not compensate injured persons effectively or efficiently. Section V will propose
an alternative solution, a no-fault compensation fund comparable to the
system currently used in New Zealand.
Current Japanese Law

I.

In Japan, an injured person is likely to use one of two main theories to
seek a remedy from a wrongdoer.14 The first is based on tort; the second on contract. This Section will describe both theories.
Tort Theory
As Japan does not recognize a strict product liability theory, 15 a plaintiff
must prove negligence under Article 70916 of the Civil Code. 17 Under
Article 709, the plaintiff must prove: 1) the intentional or negligent act
of the defendant; 2) that such act violates another person's rights;
A.

In 1975, the Product Liability Research Group prepared a Draft Model Law on

Product Liability based on strict-liability theory. Yosuhiro Fujita,Japan2, in 1 PRODUCT LIABILITY: A MANUAL OF PRACTICE (W. Freedman ed., 1987) [hereinafter Fujita,
Japan];YoungheeJin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, Product Liability Law in Japan:An Introduction to a Developing Area of Law, 14 GA.J. INT'L & Comp. L. 29, 57-59 (1984). The

draft, however, did not become law because the Ministry ofJustice did not support it.
Fujita,Japan, supra, at 2. For the English translation of the Draft, see Ottley & Ottley,

supra, at 88-92.
12. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.

13. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
14. For additional laws concerning product liability, see Cohen & Martin, supra
note 5, at 325.
15. In areas other than product liability, the Japanese Civil Code provides for
strict liability.

CIVIL CODE OFJAPAN
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN].

151 (Ministry ofJustice trans., 1972) [hereinafter

16. Id. at 149 (Article 709 states: "A person who violates intentionally or negli-

gently the right of another is bound to make compensation for damage arising
therefrom.")

17. MINP6 [CIVIL CODE], Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898. For an
English translation of MINP6, see id. For a brief introduction to the Civil Code, see Y.
NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAw 197-202 (A. Angelo trans., 1976); Fujita,
Japan, supra note 11, at 1.
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3) causation between the damages and the intentional or negligent act;
and 4) damages. Japanese negligence, which resembles American negligence theory, constitutes a violation of the duty of due care. 18 The
duty requires one to foresee harmful results. 1 9 The standard for this
duty varies. 20 In multiple injury cases, like asbestos cases in the U.S.,
manufacturers of food or drugs owe a very high standard of care "tantamount to liability without fault."'2 1 With this high standard of due care,
Japanese courts presume the existence of negligence in mass injury
cases, though the Japanese Code does not formally recognize such a
presumption. 2 2 In single injury cases such as car accident cases, however, a presumption of negligence has not been recognized, and a plain23
tiff must prove the defendant's negligence.
A plaintiff also must show that the negligent act of the defendant
caused his or her injury. In Japan, the plaintiff must prove causation by
"[a conviction] beyond a reasonable doubt." 24 Although scholars have
argued "that the degree of proof be reduced to that of probability,"25
26
Japanese courts seldom relax the standard.
Bystanders, as well as consumers of products, may maintain a cause
of action because "tort law which is based on negligence applies to any
type of person aggrieved by defective products." '2 7 A plaintiff may
recover personal injury damages, lost profits, pain and suffering, and
damages to products other than the subject product, but may not
recover for damage to the product that caused the injury or punitive
damages. 28 A plaintiff's misuse of a product may trigger the application
of comparative negligence 29 provided under Article 722, paragraph 2,
18. Zentaro Kitagawa, Products Liability, in 7 DOING BusINESS INJAPAN § 4.05[4]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1989).

19. Id.; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 328.
20. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 331-32.

21. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[5]. See also Fujita,Japan,supra note 11, at 1617.
22. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[5]. See also id. § 4.05[5] n.18 (citingJapanese
court decisions finding presumption of negligence).
23. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 329-30.
24. This is called "conviction" (hakushin) theory. Kitagawa, supra note 18,
§ 4.05[5].

25. Id.
26. There are exceptions. For example in pollution cases, plaintiffs can use the
so-called "epidemiological causality doctrine." Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[5];
Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 331; Fujita,Japan,supra note 11, at 14. Under this

doctrine, circumstantial evidence is enough to prove causation. Kitagawa, supra note
18, § 4.05[5] n.20. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 331 & nn.69-70. In medical
malpractice cases, plaintiffs may use statistical data to show causation. Kitagawa,
supra note 18, § 4.05[5]; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 331 & nn.69-70; Fujita,
Japan, supra note 11, at 14.

27. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[6][a][ii]. See also Cohen & Martin, supra note
5, at 327-28; Fujita, Japan, supra note 11, at 12-14.
28. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[7][a].
29. Id. § 4.05[8] & n.37.
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may reduce
of the Civil Code.3 0 Plaintiff's consent or assumption of risk
3
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amount
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B.

Contract Theories

An aggrieved person may also choose to use two contract theories to
prove liability in product suits.
The first contract theory is "non-performance of obligation under
contract" 3 2 provided under Article 415 of the Civil Code. "If an obligor
fails to effect performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of
the obligation, the obligee may claim damages; the same shall apply to
cases where performance becomes impossible for any cause for which
the obligor is responsible." 3 3 Thus, a customer who bought a defective
good that failed to perform its essential purpose and who suffered injuries may seek recovery from the direct seller of the good.3 4 Under Article 415, the plaintiff need not prove the defendant's negligence; the
35
defendant-seller is liable unless he or she can show the lack of fault.
Under this theory, a plaintiff may recover damages not only for personal
and property loss, but also for economic loss.36
Nonetheless, Article 415 requires an important element that
excludes many plaintiffs. Since this Article is based on contract, a plain37
In addition,
tiff must be in privity of contract with the defendant.
contract.38
the
of
terms
the
under
liability
disclaim
may
manufacturers
39
The second contract theory is "the warranty of latent defect" pro30. Article 722, para. 2, provides: "If there is any fault on the part of the injured
party, the Court may take it into account in assessing the amount of the damages."
CIVIL CODE OFJAPAN, supra note 15, at 152.
31.

Where the injured assumes or is presumed to assume and consent to the risk

and injury, the wrongdoer's illegal act is exculpated, and he or she is not liable at all.
19 CHUUSHAKU MINP6 [DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE CIVIL CODE] 355 (I. Kato ed.,
1965). For the concept of consent or presumption of consent, see Tatsuahi Maeda,

Law of Torts in General, in 7 DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN, § 1.05[4][f][vi] (Z. Kitagawa ed.,

1989).
32.

KONSAIsu RoPP6, SHOWN 62 NENBAN [CONcISE COMPENDIUM OF LAWS - 1987]
375 (Hanrei Ropp5 Henshfi Iinkai ed., 1986). See Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.06[l];
Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 333; Fujita,Japan, supra note 11, at 6-9.
33. Article 415, CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 91.
34. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.06[1].
35. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 43; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 333;
Fujita, Japan, supra note 11, at 6-7.
36. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 43. For the recoverable damages under this
theory, see Fujita,Japan,supra note 11, at 7-8.
37. Thus, "a bystander or ultimate user who is not in privity of contract with the
seller cannot enforce the provisions of the article." Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at
44. Privity is not required, however, in certain cases. Fujita,Japan,supra note 11, at

6.

38. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 44-45. Nonetheless, disclaimers against
public policy are void as in the American Uniform Commercial Code. Id. Fujita,
Japan, supra note 11, at 9. See also U.C.C. § 2-719 (1977).
39. KONSAIsu RoPP6, supra note 32, at 399. See also Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11,
at 44; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 333; Fujita,Japan, supra note 11, at 4-5.
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vided under Articles 57040 and 56641 of the Civil Code. These articles,
however, also require privity, and allow the seller to disclaim liability in
advance. 4 2 Moreover, "damages recoverable thereunder are limited to
the subject matter itself or counter-value [contract price]."143 In addition, "[i]f the seller can prove that the buyer had knowledge of the
defect, the buyer will assume the risk, and this assumption of risk will be
taken into account in calculating damages."' 44 These unfavorable
requirements often lead plaintiffs in Japanese product liability lawsuits
45
to rely on tort theory.
H. Proposals to Reform Product Liability Law
Proposed drafts for a strict product liability law in Japan have been prepared by the Private Law Academy Reporters' Group of 1990,46 the
Tokyo Federation of Bar Associations, 47 and leading opposition political parties such as Shakai-t5 (Socialist Party) and Kmei-tiT.48 Although
the details of the proposals differ, these fundamental elements are the
same: 1) they provide a strict liability theory; 2) they presume the existence of defects and the existence of causation in certain situations; and
3) they allow reduction of damages only ifthe plaintiff's negligence is
gross. In addition, the Group of 1990's draft clearly provides that manufacturers' liability will not be lessened even if damages are caused
jointly by the manufacturer and by other defendants. The Tokyo Federation of Bar Association's draft provides for punitive damages, and
would require a discovery system similar to the system under the Fed49
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in the U.S.
A.

Strict Liability Theory of the Proposed Reforms

This Section of the Note will describe the proposed reforms. All of the
drafts discussed in this Note include strict liability theory. For example,
Article 2 of the draft prepared by the Group of 1990 states: "Manufacturers owe a duty to compensate for damages caused by defects of a
40. CIvIL CODE OFJAPAN, supra note 15, at 123. ("[I]f any latent defects exist in
the subject-matter of a sale, the provision of Article 566 shall apply ...")
41. Id. at 122 ("Where the subject-matter of a sale is subject to ...[easement,
pledge, etc.] and the buyer is unaware thereof, he may rescind the contract only if the

object of the contract cannot be attained thereby; in other cases the buyer may only
claim damages.") See also Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 333 n.77.
42. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 44-45. Privity, however, is not required in
certain cases. Fujita, Japan, supra note 11, at 4.
43. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.06[2]. See also Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at
333 & n.79; Fujita,Japan, supra note 11, at 4.
44. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 44.
45. See id. at 45; Fujita,Japan,supra note 11, at 5.
46. See supra note 11.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The 1975 Product Liability Research Group draft also calls for a U.S. style
discovery system. See supra note 11.
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product."' 50 Titled "Non-negligence Liability," Article 2 eliminates negligence as an element for recovery. Under current Japanese tort law,5 1
plaintiffs cannot recover-even if the subject product is defectiveunless they prove that the defendant was negligent in placing the defective product onto the market. It is, however, difficult for plaintiffs to
prove the defendant's negligence in view of complicated production
processes and complex streams of commerce. 5 2 Consequently, the purpose of this Article and comparable articles in other proposals appears
to require
to depart from traditional Japanese negligence theory and
53
only proof of a "defect," an objectively clearer standard.
The drafts require plaintiffs to show defectiveness in order to
recover. 54 Article 4 of the draft prepared by the Group of 1990 explains
that " 'defect' means lack of the safety a person legitimately expects in
light of all of the circumstances including the items listed as follows:
1) Reasonably expected use of product, and 2) Explanation, indication,
warning, and other labels regarding the product." 5 5 The Japanese
drafts adopt the "consumer's expectation test." 5 6 Products that deviate
from a consumer's expectation of safety would be considered defective.
Therefore, even a product that does not deviate from its design could be
considered defective.
According to Japanese custom, a product is not defective insofar as
it was manufactured in accordance with its design. 5 7 When a consumer
50.

GROUP OF 1990's DRAFr, supra note 11. See also TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR

AsSOCIATIONS' DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 3: "Manufacturers shall owe duty to com-

pensate economic as well as non-economic damages of those who suffered bodily or
property damages caused by defect of product." Opposition parties also propose
similar articles in their drafts. See Article 3 of the SHAKAI-T5 DRAFr, supra note 11, and
Article 5 of the K6MEI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11.
Under Article 7 of the Group of 1990's Draft, "manufacturers" include manufacturers of completed products, component parts or materials and others who can be
regarded as manufacturers by fixing labels or trademarks. Importers of products also
owe the same duties as manufacturers. Other drafts that have similarly broad definitions of "manufacturers," include Article 2 of the Tokyo Federation of Bar Associations' draft, Article 3 of the K6MEI-T6 DRAFT, and Article 2 of the SHAKAI-T6 DRAFT.
See supra note 11.
51. CIVIL CODE OFJAPAN, supra note 15, art. 709.
52. This is more burdensome for Japanese plaintiffs than those in the United
States because an American-type discovery system is not presently used in Japan.
Plaintiffs must prove a defendant's negligence without the help of depositions, interrogatories, or requests for production of documents. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., GROUP OF 1990 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 3.
54. Id.
55. GROUP OF 1990's DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 4.
56. See, e.g., id.; Kiyomitsu Yoshimi, Seizdbutsu Sekinin RippJ heno Teian, NBL, Oct.
1, 1990, at 53, 54 (NBL is aJapanese business lawjournal. A copy of the issue cited is
available from the author).
57. See Michiko Kamiyama, JVaga Kuni ni okeru Seizdbutsu Sekinin Ripp5 no DjkW to
Mondaiten (1): Sekinin ron, Inga Kankei ron o Chinshin to shite [Trend and Problems of Product
Liability Legislation in Our Country (1): Focusing on Liability and Causation Theory], 41 JifY
TO SEIGI (No. 10) 26, 27-28, 31 (1990) (arguing that failure-to-warn or design defects
are not easily recognized as defects in Japan).
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is injured because his or her use was not in accordance with a manufacturer's expected use, the injured consumer is to blame under the traditional Japanese approach. 58 The manufacturer's expectation, not the
consumer's expectation, sets the standard of defectiveness. Though the
reforms would compensate some injured consumers, they do not indicate what level of safety should be legitimately expected by consumers. 59 The drafts use the phrase "reasonable use," but defining that
term is problematic. 60 The drafts also consider warnings, instructions
and labels as factors relevant in determining defectiveness. Thus, failure to warn or inadequate instructions could provide the basis of a claim
of defectiveness, even when the subject product has no design or manu61
facturing defect.
The draft of the Group of 1990 would deny defenses based on
development risks. 62 Development risks address the question of the
extent to which "producers should be held strictly liable for defects that
were not yet discernable when the product was put into circulation,
because of the state of scientific and technological knowledge at the
time." 6 3 The caveat in Paragraph 4 of Article 8 of the draft states that
"[t]he fact that this draft does not address development risks shows the
intention that the defense of the development risk will not be
allowed." 64 The failure to recognize a defense based on development
risks is problematic because holding manufacturers liable for these risks
"would inhibit innovation, increase industry costs, contribute to the
structural unemployment problem, and weaken ... industries' competi65
tive position in the world market."
B. Presumption of Defect as Well as Causation
The Japanese reform proposals presume both defectiveness and causation. For example, paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Group of 1990's draft
states, "It is presumed that there is a defect on a product when damage
occurs by using the product in a reasonably expected manner and if such
damage does not usually occur in such use." 6 6 Under the Restatement
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
63. Sara F. Leibman, Note, The European Community's Products Liability: Is the U.S.
Experience Applicable?, 18 Law & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 795, 804 (1986).

64.

GROUP OF

1990's DRAF-r, supra note 11.

65. Note, Product Liability: A Comparison of U.S. and EECApproaches, 13 SYR.J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 129, 176 & n.197 (1956).
66. "It is presumed that there is a defect in the product when the product lacks
such safety as other products manufactured in the same production process have."
GROUP OF

1990's DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 5, para. 2. This provision seems to define

a manufacturing defect. Although no other draft has a similar provision regarding
the manufacturing defect, the other drafts contain provisions similar to paragraph 1
of Article 5 of the Group of 1990 Draft. See K6MEI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 8,
para. 1; SHAKAI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 5; TOKYO FEDERATION OF BARS AssOCIATIONS' DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 5.
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of Torts, plaintiffs must prove that a defect, i.e., an unreasonably dangerous condition, existed at the time when the product left the defendant's hand. 67 Under the draft, however, plaintiffs must show only that
unusual damage occurred in spite of a reasonable use of the subject
product. 68 Given that plaintiffs under current Japanese law must prove
the subjective fault of defendants, the draft, which does not require the
proof of existence of defectiveness at the time the product left the
defendants' hands, to say nothing of the proof of negligence, is twosteps stricter than current Japanese law.
As for causation, Article 6 of the Group of 1990's draft provides,
"When damage similar to that which usually occurs because of a defect
occurs, that similar damage is presumed to be caused by the defectiveness of that product." 69 Instead of proving that a specific defect caused
a specific injury, plaintiffs need only prove that their damage is similar to
other damage that usually occurs due to a defect.
Under the current law, plaintiffs must prove actual causation, 70 a
burdensome task. In some cases it is impossible to produce scientific
proof of causation. Nonetheless, under the current law, unless plaintiffs
prove causation, they must bear the economic and non-economic burdens of their injuries. The Group of 1990's draft, however, shifts the
burden at the expense of manufacturers. Under this draft, even when
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can prove or disprove actual causation, manufacturers would be liable if plaintiffs can show similarity of
damage. Even though this will not help plaintiffs when there has been
67. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the
time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff;
and unless evidence can be produced which will support the condition that it
was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

402A, comment g (1966).

68. Although some American courts permit recovery where an inference that the
relatively new product was defective can be drawn from proof that it functioned
improperly in normal use, see, e.g., Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering, 407 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1969), this is only in the case of new products, and not all U.S. courts permit
such an inference. For the issue of circumstantial proof of defects, seeJAMEs A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCT LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 18-25

(1987).
69. See also K6MEI-T6

DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 9; SHAKAI-T6 DRAFT,supra note 11,
art. 6. The Tokyo Federation of Bar Associations' draft has a more plaintiff-oriented
article as explained later in this section of this Note.
70. Japanese courts sometimes recognize epidemiological or statistical evidence
in mass injury cases under the current negligence theory. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text; Cohen &Martin, supra note 5, at 331; Fujita,Japan, supra note 11,
at 16. In addition, in these cases the actual causal relation between defects and injuries was revealed in some reasonable degree by the government investigation.
Hideyuki Kobayashi, Seiz~butsu Sekinin no Genj5 to Tenb6" Kashitsusekinin kara
Genkakusehinin, Ingakankei no Sh5mei o ChzTshinni [Present State and the Future of Product
Liability: Focusing on the Shift from Negligence to Strict Liability and Proof of Causation],41
JIvO TO SEIGI (No. 10) 5, 10-11 (1990).
For the indication of high transaction costs, see, e.g., RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281,
1319 (1980).
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no similar damage in other cases, the presumption clause is one-step
closer to absolute liability than the current law.
Manufacturers liablity-even when causation is unclear-is often
based on the assumption either that manufacturers benefit by producing
products or that they can allocate risk more effectively.
Although most of the Japanese drafts have a similar content, the
Tokyo Bar's draft is most pro-consumer. The Tokyo Bar's Article 5 provides, "It is presumed that there was a defect in a product and that damage
was caused by the defect when the injured party used, kept, transported, and disposed of the product in an expected manner and damage occurred."7 1 Under this
draft, manufacturers would be liable if the plaintiff could prove normal
use of a product and occurrence of harm. Though the adversary may
rebut this presumption, 72 disproving the presumption is very difficult
because the defendant is required to prove a negative-that the defect
did not cause the harm. 73 Thus, the plaintiff's burden of proof in the
prima facie case is dramatically lightened, and in this sense, the Tokyo
Bar's draft is closer to absolute liability than the other drafts under
which the plaintiff must prove at least similarity of harm to gain benefit
of a presumption of causation.
C.

Reduction of Damages (Comparative Fault)

Article 13 of The Group of 1990's draft provides, "Liability of manufacturers may be excused or lessened when damage occurred by both a
defect of the product and gross negligence of the injured person." 74 The
Caveat for Article 13 says: " '1) reasonably expected use of product'
under the Article 4 is not the gross negligence provided for in this
Article."
Under Article 13 only the gross negligence of plaintiffs may result
in the reduction of damages. 7 5 InJapanese law, the concept of a defect
71. TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS' DRAFT, supra note 11, at art. 5
(emphasis added).
72. HIDEO FUjIKI ET AL., H6URITSUGAKU SH6 JITEN [COMPACT DICTIONARY OF
LEGAL STUDIES] 535 (1988).
73. TORT PcLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP
ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILrrY AND AFFORDABILITY 1-3 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP]

(report presented to President Reagan by inter-agency working group established by
the Attorney General and consisting of representatives of 10 agencies and the White
House). Professor Huber also explains the difficulty of proving a negative:

Today's epidemiologist may be quite certain that the large majority of cancers are not caused by exposures [to chemicals or radiation], but the courts,

once again, are lagging decades behind. The only convincing negative case
in such lawsuits is an affirmative demonstration that some other factor caused
the disease complained of-but such proof is unavailable in a day when the
precise origin of most long-term disease is still untraceable.
PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 113
74. GROUP OF 1990's DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 13 (emphasis added).

(1988).

75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Other drafts have similar articles.
K6MEI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 10; TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS'
DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 6; SHAKAI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 7.
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usually contemplates a manufacturing defect. 76 Thus, a product is not
considered defective when an injury is caused by the consumer's misuse.
Failure to warn or improper design for certain consumer uses is rarely
regarded as a defect in Japan. Therefore, it seems that to extend compensation for those who misuse products, Article 13 of the Group of
1990's draft permits only plaintiffs' gross negligence to be considered a
factor in reducing the set-off of damages. CurrentJapanese law allows a
77
set-off that considers plaintiff's negligence.
Under the Group of 1990's draft, a consumer's simple negligence
would not decrease compensation. Reasonably expected use would not
be gross negligence that would decrease the damages under current law.
Even misuse, if reasonably foreseeable, would not decrease the amount
of compensation. This Article may give manufacturers an incentive to
design safer products and give consumers more instructions and warnings. Overwarning, however, might occur because manufacturers would
be liable for all damages caused by any misuse except gross
78
negligence.
The Tokyo Bar's draft is even more pro-plaintiff than the Group of
1990's draft. Article 7 of the Tokyo Bar's draft states, "When the
injured party is guilty of gross negligence, the court may consider this
when determining the amount of damages." 79 Although the manufacturer's liability may be "excused or lessened" under the Group of 1990's
draft,8 0 the Tokyo Bar's draft does not permit courts to excuse the manufacturer's liability even if the plaintiff is guilty of gross negligence.
Thus, a manufacturer might be liable even if an injured consumer used a
product with knowledge of the defectiveness.
D. Joint and Several Liability
The draft of the Group of 1990 provides in Article 10, "When multiple
parties owe a duty of compensation under this draft, each party shall
owe joint and several liability." '8 Article 12 of the draft adds "Manufacturers' liability shall not be decreased even when damage is caused by
both a defect of the product and an act of a third person."
Current Japanese law has a similar joint and several liability clause.
Article 719 of the Civil Code states, "If two or more persons have by
theirjoint unlawful act caused harm to another, they are jointly and separately liable to make compensation for such damage ....,,82 For example, when polluted water from factories damages crops, those factories
76. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
77. CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 152.
78. For more on the issue of overwarning, see infra notes 145-46 and accompany-

ing text.

79. TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR AsSOCIATIONS' DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 7.
80. GROUP OF 1990's DRAF, supra note 11, art. 13.
81. GROUP OF 1990's DRAF, supra note 11, art. 10. Other drafts have similar articles, including: TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS' DRAFT, supra note 11, art.
4; K6MEI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 6; and SHAKAI-T6 DRAFT, supra note 11, art. 4.
82. CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN, supra note 15, at 151.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 25

are jointly and severally liable to the one crop owner.8 3 Under Article
719, each joint tortfeasor's act must satisfy the elements of tort, but a
84
concerted action, such as a conspiracy, is not required.
The Group of 1990's draft does not change current Japanese law,
which provides for joint and several liability. The other articles of this
draft, however, when combined with joint and several liability may have
dramatic effects upon Japanese manufacturers. Under each draft, if a
manufacturer is found liable under other articles of the draft, then a
manufacturer who is not at fault, or only minimally at fault, must still pay
all damages. This system is similar to the present U.S. system8 5 where a
person must pay irrespective of the degree of his or her fault. This is
typical of a deep-pocket approach where those with money are forced to
86
pay even if only slightly at fault or even if not at fault.
E.

Punitive Damages

The Tokyo Bar Draft provides in Article 7: "When there is intentional
wrongdoing or gross negligence on the part of manufacturer, a court
may, at the request of the plaintiff, order the manufacturer to pay up to
twice the value of the damages provided in Article 3 in addition to the
damages in that Article." 8 7 Only the Tokyo Bar Draft contemplates
punitive damages, which could equal treble damages.
The threat of punitive damages may deter manufacturers from producing defective products. In addition, injured parties who have suffered minimal harm may be more likely to bring suits due to the
possibility of receiving punitive damages in excess of the actual
damages.
Current Japanese law does not permit punitive damages.8 8 This
prohibition of punitive damages is "due to the clear-cut distinction
between criminal sanctions and civil remedies." 8 9 The idea of punitive
damages, which are paid not to the government but to private plaintiffs,
is foreign to Japanese law as Japan does not allow punitive damages in
other areas of law such as anti-monopoly law.9 0
F.

Discovery

The Tokyo Bar Draft, as well as the draft prepared by the Product Liability Research Group in 1975, proposes a discovery system similar to the
83. FujIKI ET AL., supra note 72, at 179.
84. Id.
85. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 73, at 64.

86. Id.
87. TOKYO FEDERATION OF BAR AssOcIATIONs' DRAFr, supra note 11.
88. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.05[7][a].
89. Id.
90. Although the Japanese antimonopoly law is modeled on the American anti-

trust law, Japan's version does not provide for treble damages. As in other civil law
countries, public issues in Japan are exclusively litigated by the government. The
concept of a "private attorney general" is foreign toJapan. See Ottley & Ottley, supra

note 11, at 40.
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discovery system established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Tokyo Bar proposes to adopt depositions, interrogatories, demands
for production of documents, and demands for confession. 9 ' An expansive discovery system will help plaintiffs receive the information necessary to prove their cases.
Under the current Japanese law, plaintiffs cannot obtain materials
leading to evidence at trial compulsorily from defendants.9 2 Although
the Japanese Civil Procedure Code permits proof-taking prior to the
commencement of an action or prior to the trial, 9 3 "this is [only] an
extraordinary device different from discovery practiced in American
courts." 9 4 This is one reason why Japanese consumer-plaintiffs have a
difficult time winning tort cases. 9 5
Under current Japanese law, where plaintiffs must prove negligence, the lack of discovery makes this burden of proof hard to fulfil.

I1. Background of the Differences Between Japanese Proposals and the
U.S. Law/EC Directive
Some elements of the Japanese proposals for a strict product liability
statute are stricter than both the U.S. law and the EC law in some
respects. The strictness of these proposals may be a response to the
difficulty of compensating consumers through litigation in the present
Japanese legal system. Nevertheless, this Note argues that stricter substantive law, given the Japanese legal system, may not provide effective
compensation. Injapan, civil procedure rules do not favor plaintiffs and
the number of lawyers is very small. Consequently, if Japan wants to
compensate plaintiffs more effectively, it must either institute major
reform to its legal system or rely on an alternative compensation system
similar to New Zealand's. This Section will analyze why the presentJapanese legal system does not adequately provide compensation.
A.

Higher Degree of Proof

The higher degree of proof required in current Japanese civil actions
does not allow plaintiffs to receive compensation as easily as in the U.S.
In Japan, there are no jury trials. Judges determine the facts by
91. See Masahisa Yamaguchi, Tokyo Bengoshikai Seiz5butsu Sekinin H5 Shian no
Mondaiten [Problems of the Product Liability Act Proposed by the Tokyo Bar Association], 16
KxGv6 KANKYO (no. 5), 1, 11-12 (1990).

92. TAHAAKI HATrORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN
§ 6.03 n.10 (1985). Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 39 (footnote omitted).
("[V]arious forms of discovery known in the United States do not exist in Japan.
Interrogatories and depositions, which permit the discovery of evidence, are not used
in Japan."). In the United States, information subject to discovery need not be
admissible as evidence at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
93. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 77, art. 343 (Supreme Court ofJapan trans., 1950)
[hereinafter Civ. PRO. (Sup. Ct.)].
94. HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 6.03.
95. KYODO 10/17/90, supra note 8. See Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 330, 33940.
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freely evaluating the evidence. 96 The Japanese civil procedure code
does not define the degree of proof required; therefore, opinion on this
point varies. 9 7 Some argue that "a preponderance of evidence" is sufficient, but the prevailing view requires proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt."9 8
The burden of proof borne by American plaintiffs is lower than the
burden of Japanese plaintiffs. Under U.S. law, plaintiffs may generally
satisfy their burden of proof by a "preponderance of evidence" in civil
cases. 99 Only in criminal cases, is "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
required. 10 0 Thus, the burden for plaintiffs in Japan makes recovery
more difficult than in the U.S.
B. High Litigation Costs
High litigation costs inJapan are another reason why lawsuits are not an
effective device to compensate the injured. In Japan, plaintiffs must, at
the time of filing, affix to the complaint revenue stamps required by law;
the amount of the revenue stamps depends upon the value of the
claim. 1 1 The more plaintiffs seek in their complaint, the more they
must pay at the time of filing. 10 2 For example, a plaintiff must affix
257,600 yen revenue stamps when he or she seeks 50,000,000 yen in
96. HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 7.05[13].
97. Id.
98. Id. Under the prevailing view:
[T]he judge ... is required to be convinced at least to such an extent that
people in general might behave in daily life, relying on his finding with full
satisfaction. The judge can find a certain fact true only when he has been
convinced that it is ninety-nine per cent true; he may not, when he has been
convinced it is seventy per cent true, but thirty per cent untrue.
Id. (emphasis added).
As to the degree of proof required for causation, Saiko Saibansho (the Japanese
Supreme Court) has stated that "it is necessary . . . that the judge has acquired
through the proof, a conviction of the existence of such a relationship to the degree that
an averageperson will not entertain any doubt." Miura v.Japan, 29 Minshu 1417 (Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 24, 1975), HANREI HYAKUSEN, 2nd ed., Case No. 80 (1982), reprinted in HATTORI
& HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 7.05[13] n.469 (emphasis added).
99. RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
655 (6th ed. 1990).
100. Id. at 657.
101. HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 7.01[2] & n.15. ("The amount of
revenue stamps . . . is calculated by the filing fee schedule provided in Minji sosho
hiyo to ni kansuru horitu (Law Concerning Civil Litigation Costs and the Like), Law
No. 40 of 1971, art. 3 and annexed list No. 1.")
102. "[Fliling fees seem high. They are graduated by the amount of damages
sought, so that the suit for one million dollars would cost over five thousand dollars
in filing fees alone." Michael Thomson, Dispute Resolution in Japan: The Non-litigious
Way, 24 L. Soc'YJ. 30, 30-31 (1986). DavidJ. Przerachi, Note, "Working It Out". A
JapaneseAlternative to Fighting It Out, 37 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 149, 165 (1989) (footnote omitted) ("Filing fees ... are pro-rated to the amount in controversy, and can
be very costly.")
Compared with this, American filing fees are cheap. "Filing fees for lawsuits [in the
U.S.] are relatively inexpensive. They are fixed low, irrespective of the amount in
controversy. Filing fees can cost between $30 and $100, depending upon the jurisdiction." Id. at 167 (footnote omitted).
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damages. ' 0 3 High court costs discourage litigation.' 0 4
C.

Low Probability of Victory and the Burden of Costs

In Japan, losing parties must pay not only their own litigation costs but
also their adversaries' costs. 10 5 Thus, the risk of initiating lawsuits is
great when the probability of winning is low. Since generally, in Japan,
the probability for plaintiffs to win in litigation is low,' 0 6 the risk that
they may owe huge litigation costs is great. Consequently, some organizations are proposing changes in the substantive law which will permit
plaintiffs to win more frequently.
D.

Small Number of Lawyers

The paucity of lawyers 10 7 in Japan also contributes to the lack of protection for consumers. 10 8 Nevertheless, this does not justify the proposed
strict product liability law reform, which would encourage an increase in
103. Michiko Kamiyama, Yamaguchi Kyoju no Hihan ni Kotaete (In Response to Professor
Yamaguchi's Criticism), 16 KIGYo KANKYO (No. 5) 15, 23 (1990) (A copy of this article,
written in Japanese by M. Kamiyama, a lawyer, in response to Professor Yamaguchi's
criticism against the strict liability statute draft prepared by the Tokyo Bar is available
from the author.) For the same lawsuit seeking 50,000,000 yen damages, the plaintiff
must also bear actual expenses of about 300,000 yen for photocopies of documents.
Id. Besides these costs, the plaintiff must pay, in advance, lawyer's initiation fees. See
infra note 110.
104. High "lawyer's expenses, courts costs, particularly filing fees which are
graded by the size of recovery claimed" work as deterrents. Takeyoshi Kawashima,
Dispute Resolution in ContemporaryJapan, at 285, n.24, citing comments of Thomas
Blackmore made at a conference on Japanese law held at Harvard Law School on
September 5-9, 1961, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND
MATERIALS, (H. Tanaka ed., 1976). "These are recoverable by the winning party, but
the necessity of hazarding new capital on the chance of winning the suit is a serious
deterrent. The deterrent factor varies directly with the degree of uncertainty as to
liability and the amount of probable damage." Id.
105. HATTORI &HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 10.01 & n.4. Article 89 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he costs of the suit shall be borne by the party
defeated." Civ. PRO. (Sup. Ct.), supra note 93, at 21. See also HATrORI & HENDERSON,
supra note 92, § 10.01 (footnote omitted).
[These] litigation expenses include all costs incurred in prosecuting an action
or proceeding .... [T]he prevailing party is [also] entitled to recover.., the
cost of preparing the complaint or other [filing] documents .... the cost of
travel to file them, and the cost of travel to retain a lawyer to commence or
oppose an action. Preparatory expenses also include costs of collecting evidence and interviewing indispensable witnesses.
106. KYODO 10/17/90, supra note 8. Thus, Japanese lawyers do not want to represent injured consumers in litigation. Id.
107. "The proportion of practicing lawyers is quite small compared with other
developed countries. While in West Germany, for example, there is one lawyer for
every 2,300 people, in Japan the ratio is one to 10,000." HATTORI & HENDERSON,
supra note 92, § 2.09. TheJapanese ratio reflects those lawyers licensed for commercial practice. Ray August, The Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1992, at 72,
73.
108. "In speaking to the Japanese consumer groups, [Ralph] Nader said ....
'[t]here are only a handful of malpractice and product liability lawyers there. How
can you redress imbalances of power with so few lawyers?'" NIKKEI 11/17/90, supra
note 7.
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the number of lawsuits.' 0 9
The shortage of lawyers results in high lawyers' costs. I 0 Since the
number of lawyers is small, Japanese consumers, including plaintiffs,
must "purchase their legal services in a cartelized market .... Faced
with the [legal] industry's cartel, plaintiffs in Japan incur ...higher costs
to litigate.""' Minimum fee schedules established by the Japanese Fed1 12
eration of Bar Associations and local bar associations raise prices,
and thus "make legal services less accessible." ' 13
The shortage of lawyers may also contribute to the lack of concern
by lawyers for helpless consumers. Professor S. Yoshimi pointed out
that "Japanese lawyers are quite reluctant to take up product liability
cases." 1 1 4 Consumers injured in single-accident injury cases have little
hope of succeeding in litigation unless there is some clear evidence of
negligence and causation. Thus, lawyers who have little hope of profiting from these consumers are reluctant to take such cases.
E.

Lack of Contingent Fee System

The fact that contingent fees are uncommon in Japan" 15 may also
render litigation ineffective as a compensation device in Japan. In the
Nader's view was challenged during the question and answer period by
Yasushi Hara of the Asahi Shinbun, [the leading Japanese nation wide newspaper], who suggested a cultural explanation.
Noting that the American TV show Dallas was very unpopular in Japan
compared with other American programs, Hara said that showed that, "[tIhe
Japanesepeople don't like interpersonal conflict, such as brother against brother.
That's why there is so little litigation in Japan."
Id. (emphasis added).
109. The imbalance between the number of lawyers and the increased number of
lawsuits would create much higher lawyer's fees. These fees would be shifted to the
prices of goods in Japan through risk-spreading if the proposed strict liability statute
became effective. Then Japanese lawyers would enjoy increased incomes, while consumers would suffer from higher commodity prices.
110. "[Flees in Japan may be high even by American standards." J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the ConsensualMyth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to
Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE LJ. 604, 633 (1985).
To seek 50,000,000 yen in damages, the plaintiff is required to pay a 1,991,000 yen
(approximately 25% of the damages sought on the complaint) initiation fee for a
lawyer's services. Kamiyama, Yamaguchi Kyju no Hihan ni Kotaete [In Response to Professor Yamaguchi's Criticism], supra note 103, at 23.
Meanwhile, "because the initiation fee is not contingent and must be paid at the
outset, a Uapanese] attorney takes a much smaller risk in exchange for his 'cut' in the
litigation ...." Ramseyer, supra, at 633.
111. J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The RationalLitigant: Settlement Amounts
and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. L. STUD. 263, 275 (1989).
112. J. Mark Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers and Lawyer Substitutes: The Market for
Regulation in Japan, 27 HARV. INT'L LJ. 499, 509, 512 (1986).
113. Id. at 513.
114. KYODO 10/17/90, supra note 8.
115. "Asked what [Japanese lawyers] thought of the contingent fee system, more
than one-half of the respondents said they could not say that it was desirable. Some
even went out of their way and said, 'it is absolutely undesirable ....
' Zensuki
Ishimura & Yuriko Kaminaga, Attorneys and Cases Involving Automobile Accidents, 9 LAW
INJAPAN 83, 115-16 (1976).
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U.S., contingent fees encourage both injured plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring lawsuits against "deep-pocket" defendants.' 6 Even indigent injured persons can receive legal services needed to obtain
compensation. 1 7 Nevertheless, many critics of contingent fees suggest
the system encourages frivolous suits and increases verdict awards as
well as settlement amounts. 1 8 Currently, Japan has neither the
problems nor the benefits of a contingent fee system. Ordinary persons,
who must pay legal fees without a contingent basis, are less encouraged
to bring lawsuits than if contingent fee agreements were more common.
Lack of Legal Aid

F.

Lack of legal aid for civil cases is also given as reason for the unavailability of a lawsuit as a dispute-resolution device."t 9 The Code of Civil Pro20
which
cedure in Japan allows sosho kyuujo (assistance-in-litigation),'
12
excuses plaintiffs "from prepaying litigation costs." ' Courts, however, do not extend sosho kyuujo to plaintiffs who have average
incomes. 122 Therefore, plaintiffs with average incomes must pay the
high Japanese litigation costs before obtaining damages.
G.

Lack of a Jury System

The lack of a jury system in Japan1 23 may explain why plaintiffs in Japan
cannot receive as much compensation as their American counterparts.
24
The jury system in the U.S. is said to encourage large recoveries.'
and large awards are said to be causes of a
Juries' emotional responses
12 5
U.S.
the
in
crisis
tort
A Critique of the Drafts of Strict Product Liability Law
Today, while some U.S. legislators are trying to restrict the pro-plaintiff
IV.

116. See Leibman, supra note 63, at 809-10.
117. "In the United States, there are legal scholars who hold the view that the
contingent fee system helps indigent victims seek a court settlement through legal
actions or through attorneys and that it plays the role of public legal aid." Ishimura
& Kaminaga, supra note 115, at 116 (footnote omitted).
118. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of
U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Business Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9J. L. &
COM. 167, 178-79 (1989); Leibman, supra note 63, at 809-11.

119. "The Japanese Legal Aid Society (Nihon Hritsu Fujyo Kyjkai) was established
as late as 1952, and [has operated] only since 1958 ... with financial assistance from
the government. But this support is not extensive in its scope." Hideo Tanaka &
Ahio Takeuchi, The Role of PrivatePersons in the Enforcement of Law: A Comparison Study of
JapaneseandAmerican Law, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 34 (1974), reprinted in THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 104, at 342.
120. Civ. PRO. (Sup. Ct.), supra note 93, at 25 (art. 118).
121. HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 92, § 2.10. This assistance does not cover
attorneys' fees. Id. For additional explanation of assistance-in-litigation, see id.

§ 10.09.
122. Kamiyama, supra note 103, at 23.
123. Fujita, Japan, supra note 11, at 3.
124. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 118, at 176-77; Leibman, supra note 63, at 811.
125. Leibman, supra note 63, at 802, 811.
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trend in products liability cases, 126 organizations in Japan are demanding strict product liability to protect consumers.1 2 7 Some proponents of
Japanese legal reform argue that the current proposals will deter manufacturers from distributing defective products;12 8 others argue that such
29
reforms are necessary to adequately compensate injured persons.'
Groups favoring strict product liability law, however, have neither
shown the public the disadvantages of their proposed legal reforms nor
presented viable alternatives, such as a no-fault compensation
30
system.1
A.

Enormous Transaction Costs

Some consumer groups, scholars, opposition parties, and plaintiffs' lawyers, claim strict product liability is needed because injured persons are
not adequately compensated inJapan.13 l A desire to better compensate
the injured has been the motivating force behind the drafts.' 3 2 Nonetheless, they have failed to recognize that strict product liability is not an
effective system for compensating the injured. The underlying policy of
strict product liability law in the U.S. is to spread risk through a small
increase in the price of consumer goods. i
Manufacturers can buy
product liability claim insurance from insurers and pass on the insurance
costs by adding the cost of the premiums to the prices of their products.
Thus, rather than leaving injured parties without any compensation, the
U.S. system compensates them even when a manufacturer's clear fault
cannot be proven.i 3 4 Under this system, the prices of goods include
product liability insurance fees. Consumers essentially buy compulsory
product liability insurance whenever they buy goods.13 5 Because of the
enormous cost of product liability "insurance," however, product costs
36
rise.i
126. James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Product
Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 480, 487 (1990).
127. Iinkai, supra note 5, at 4.

128. One of the reasons given for the need for legislation of a strict product liability statute in Japan is the necessity of an incentive to maintain the safety of products.
Zadankai: Seizobutsu Sehinin no Genj5 to Kadai[Round-Table: The Current State and Problems
of Product Liability], 41 JIY TO SEIGI (No. 10) 57, 59 (1990).

129. See KYODO 10/17/90, supra note 8.
130. See NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1. No Japanese plaintiff lawyers or opposition parties refer to the possible benefits of the New Zealand compensation system.
Most Japanese jurists seem to follow this trend. Only Professor H. Kobayashi mentioned that a social security system might be more cost-effective than quasi-absolute
liability in light of the transaction costs. Kobayashi, supra note 70, at 8.
131. NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1.
132. See Yamaguchi, supra note 91, at 11-12. A copy of this article is available from
the author.
133. For justifications of strict product liability, see Judge Traynor's concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
134. WORKING GROUP, supra note 73, at 30-33.
135. See id. at 31 n.24.
136.

[Flor every $1 compensation, the tort system requires the consumer to

pay approximately $3 in premiums .... while that same $1 of compensation
can be obtained through first-party health and disability insurance for only
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1. Lawyers Benefit
A strict product liability system is not only expensive for consumers, but
also ineffective for injured persons.13

7

According to the Report of the

Tort Policy Working Group:
[F]or every dollar awarded to plaintiff, 34 cents on the average is lost to
legal fees and an additional 5 cents is lost to legal expenses .... In some
cases, legal fees alone amounted to as much as 45% of plaintiff's awards
....[I]t is... difficult to justify such costs when the costs often are borne
largely by the seriously injured and by consumers who ultimately must
pay for these costs through higher prices for goods and services. The
13 8
only clear beneficiaries of this system appear to be lawyers.
Due to the shortage of lawyers, the transaction costs of strict prod-

uct liabiality law in Japan may be even higher than in the U.S. As

139
explained earlier, since the number of lawyers in Japan is quite small,
140
they can maintain cartel prices.
If legal reforms encourage injured

parties to bring suit,14 1 they will increase the demand for lawyers' services. Since the drafts do not, however, concomitantly propose to
increase the number of lawyers, 142 the current monopoly price for lawyers would skyrocket. Higher lawyers' fees would increase the transac$1.25 ....It is highly ironic that many proponents of no-fault liability argue
that such liability is in the best interest of consumers. In fact, since consumers
ultimately pay the premiums of whatever compensation scheme is devised,
quite the contrary is the case.

Id.
[This kind of tort liability tax] accounts for 30% of the price of the stepladder and over 95% of the price of childhood vaccines. [The tax] is responsible
for one-third of the price of a small airplane .... [I]t adds more to the price of
a football helmet than the cost of making it.
HUBER, supra note 73, at 3.
137. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 118, at 176 ("Because of high transaction costs,
victorious plaintiffs recover only 20% to 50% of the damages ultimately awarded.").
138. WORKING GROUP, supra note 73, at 45.
Out of every dollar paid by consumers to cover the relevant liability costs,
less than fifty cents - estimates vary downward from forty-five cents to thirty
cents - are returned to the consumers in benefits. Most of the rest - between
fifty-five and seventy cents out of every premium dollar - goes to pay lawyers,
adjusters, and the like. If I were a cynic, I would say that this is a social
insurance scheme .... [that] is being run primarily to benefit the trial bar.
ProductLiability Reform: Hearings on s.2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Comm. of Commerce, Science and Transportation,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 25 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Prof. James A. Henderson).
139. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
141. The purpose of preparing these drafts, for some Japanese organizations, is to
compensate injured persons more than they are compensated now through litigation.
NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1. Because the drafts propose to make winning easier
for plaintiffs, logically the number of lawsuits will increase.
142. "[Flormer Supreme Court ChiefJustice Takaaki Hattori noted, 'lawyers themselves often have opposed, or at least have been reluctant to see, an increase in the size of the
barforfearof'excessive competition.' "Ramseyer, supra note 112, at 515 (emphasis added)
(quoting Takaaki Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Development and
Present State, in LAw INJAPAN 111, 145 (A. von Meheren ed., 1963)).
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tion costs necessary to obtain compensation.143 The transaction costs
would be passed on to consumers in higher prices for goods. Assuming
that changes in the current system are needed, the proposed drafts are
highly inefficient. The transaction costs would absorb a huge amount of
money that could be used to compensate injured people and to prevent
the production of defective products.
2. Defensive Actions Cause Counter-Effects and Large Costs
A strict liability system also wastes money by encouraging "would-be
defendants to take perverse [and defensive] action."' 14 4 For example,
manufacturers may put too many warnings on their products because
they want to avoid liability. 14 5 Excessive warnings waste money.
In addition, excessive warnings may confuse the user. Although
manufacturers know that "overwarning" can decrease the overall effectiveness of warnings, they continue to "overwarn" in order to decrease
14 6
their exposure to suits.
An excess of detail undercuts the value of the warning in practice; to warn
of everything is to warn of nothing, and in a torrent of new data the really
crucial bits of information are likely to go unread. Overstatement is worse
still. An overly lurid warning that causes... a mother to forgo vaccinating
her young child, can cause considerably more harm than the omission of a
warning of some obscure side effect that does occasionally materialize
....And other consumers learn to adjust for overstatement by ignoring
warnings altogether. There was a fable once about crying wolf, but it
apparently
went unheeded when modern warning doctrine was being
47
framed. 1
Overwarning could occur in Japan if a strict product liability law is
adopted. Since the definition of "defect" contained in the draft proposals includes warnings, labels, and instructions,1 4 8 and since manufacturers could more easily become liable under the drafts than under current
law, Japanese manufacturers may behave more defensively and put too
many warnings on their products.14 9 The potential advantages of the
Mr. Hattori continues: "[The] barfears the competition that would arisefrom expanded
opportunitiesfor admission .
Id. at 515 n.64 (emphasis added) (quoting Hattori,
supra, at 147).
143. Thus, without accompanying proposals to change the social or legal system

with a plan to increase the number of lawyers, the drafts are not acceptable. By stirring up litigation without increasing the number of lawyers, Japanese lawyers would
benefit greatly, without significantly benefitting consumers.
144. Stephen D. Sugarman, Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory: DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 558, 582-83 (1985).

145. See id.
146. Id. at 583.
147. HUBER, supra note 73, at 15-16.
148. GROUP OF 1990's DRAFr,supra note 11, art. 4.
149. No comparison has been made between the response to warnings by Americans and by Japanese. This is probably because in Japan the concept of defects has
not included the failure to warn. For the Japanese concept of defects, see supra notes
57-58 and accompanying text.

1992

Japanese Strict Product Liability

drafts would not be met if they forced manufacturers to pay more attention to defending themselves than to the safety of consumers.
In a strict liability system, manufacturers are also forced to fight all
claims so that they do not easily become "target defendants." 150 This is
because the number of frivolous claims increases when a defendant
readily satisfies all claims. "[T]he defendant and its insurer have a
strong financial interest in fighting claims .... Giant enterprises who
are 'repeat player' defendants may view aggressive litigation as a strategic investment aimed at avoiding a reputation of being an easy
mark."' 15 1 Manufacturers must attempt to control litigation by "producing wasteful internal documentation which engineers thought unnecessary-but lawyers insisted on." 15 2 These costs are added onto the
prices of products.
While a strict product liability law would give manufacturers an
incentive to produce safer products, manufacturers might also have to
increase the amount spent on litigation. Such resources would be better
allocated to more socially desirable expenditures such as compensation
for the injured or the prevention of defects in the products themselves.
B.

Strict Liability Does Not Work as a Deterrent

Some consumers, scholars, plaintiff lawyers, and political parties argue
that strict product liability is needed because of the relaxation of the
governmental safety standards.1 53 Some argue that strict product liabil15 4
ity will deter the manufacturer from distributing defective products:
through this deterrent effect, consumers would be protected effectively.
Professor Sugarman doubts this deterrent effect of tort law. As one
of the reasons for this doubt, he pointed out that tort law is "unpredictable .. .[because of] doctrinal complexity, rapid legal change ....and
the perceived lottery-like nature of secret jury decision-making, the
vagaries of trials, and pervasive rough-and-ready settlement practices."' 5 5 Because of the unpredictability, even professionals in certain
industries may be "unaware of required standards of conduct."' 56 This
unpredictability is especially troubling in the design defect or failure to
warn cases. Professor Henderson has noted that manufacturers cannot
find a reliable safety guidance to follow because of inconsistent safety
150. Sugarman, supra note 144, at 584.
151. Id. (emphasis and note omitted).

152. Id.
153. See supra note 5.

154. For example, "Masahisa Yamaguchi, a professor of law at Yokkaichi University... expressed... 'If a law similar to that of the EC is enacted inJapan... firms

would be more cautious an [sic] pay more attention to producing safe goods.'"
KEI

NIK-

12/22/90, supra note 1.

155. Sugarman, supra note 144, at 566. See also id. at 587 (indicating that current
court decisions do not offer "design and production criteria for the firms").

156. Id. at 566 n.34.
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standards set by different courts.' 57 Japanese designers are not the
exception to this problem. Of course, Japanese designers are familiar
with U.S. governmental safety standards; as soon as or before the standards change, they receive and act upon the changes.' 5 8 Nonetheless,
they cannot understand which designs will be rendered defective, or to
what extent they should provide warnings, and why innovative design or
equipment should not be exported to the U.S. Complying with clearly
defined safety standards does not guarantee a favorable finding in
American courts. 15 9 Designers are understandably upset when they
design cars and prepare instructions and manuals only to learn that the
design that they believed to be safe was found to be defective. 160
If Japan adopts one of the proposed strict product liability drafts,
similar confusion could occur in design and failure to warn cases
because the standards for safety design in these areas are vague. As Professor Henderson noted: "more specific guidelines than 'reasonableness under the circumstances' "are needed.' 6 1 Of course, when dealing
with manufacturing defects the drafts would give manufacturers incentive to invest more money in the safety of their products. This is
because in manufacturing defect cases a defect is usually more objective
and obvious than in design or failure to warn cases. 16 2 Manufacturing
defect cases question the deviation of a product from the standard of
157. Professor James A. Henderson testified as follows: "[T]he courts are unable
to reach consistent results without more specific guidelines than 'reasonableness
under the circumstances.' What has emerged is a multibillion dollar-a-year social
insurance scheme providing little or no guidance to manufacturers regarding how
they should be designing their products to avoid liability." Hearings, supra note 138,
at 24.

158. Based upon the author's experience. See infra * after note 240.
159. Meeting the federal safety standards does not necessarily mean reasonably
safe in trial. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft, 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). For the

safety standards for motor vehicles:
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 specifically provided that 'Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued
under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law.' 15 U.S.C. 1397 (c) (1990). The committee reports and debates
specify that the purpose of this provision was to insure that 'state common
law standards of care' and the principles of 'product liability at common law'
would continue to be viable, and that the legislative safety standards were not
'to affect the rights of parties under common law . . . .' S.Rep. No. 1301,
Committee on Commerce, 89 Cong., 2d Sess.1966, p.12 ....
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (Md. 1974).
160. Professor Sugarman noted that pro-plaintiff lawsuits in the United States
often lead defendants' engineers to "perceive litigation as unjustified. As a result
managers and professionals become demoralized by participation in discovery and
trial as well as by unfavorable outcomes. They often claim [that] the tactics of plaintiffs' lawyers and the findings of uninformed jurors unjustly impugn their product or
reputation." Sugarman, supra note 144, at 584 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
161. Hearings, supra note 138, at 24 (statement of Prof. James A. Henderson).
162. HUBER, supra note 73, at 41. "Manufacturing-defect cases are straightforward. They are also comparatively rare. Far more difficult are cases in which the
product is said to be defective in design, where there is no such simple point of
comparison. Fully eighty percent of product liability cases today are of this kind." Id.
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other products manufactured in the same design. For example, a soft
drink bottle may have a crack, even though the other bottles manufactured in the same design did not. Thus, the product in question is obviously inferior to the others, and it is easy to find such a defect. Although
under the mass-production process some defective products are inevitably manufactured and distributed to the market without negligence, it is
justifiable to hold manufacturers liable because it is not fair that only the
16 3
unlucky injured person should bear that cost.

In design defect or failure to warn cases, however, the subject product did not deviate from other products and may even have satisfied government safety standards. Thus, the determination of a defect in this
product is rendered by ajury (or ajudge in Japan) by applying the vague
standard of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous (in Japan,
the lack of safety one expected in light of reasonable use, instruction,
warning, and other labels). 164 Because determinations of whether there
is a defect varies in each case of design defects or failure to warn, manufacturers cannot know what is a safe design or adequate warning. In this
way, lawsuits would not effectively deter design defects or failures to
warn. In other words, strict products liability does not work effectively
as a deterrent because it lacks precision in reliably determining what
65
constitutes a defect.'
In addition, tort law is not effective as a deterrent because the time
lag between the manufacture and distribution of products and the determination that the products are unsafe is too long. 16 6 A manufacturer
often may have ceased to produce the product long before the products
are held to be unsafe. Under this scenario, a court decision arrives too
late to deter.
In Japan, where litigation is even more prolonged than in the U.S.,
the problem may be much worse:
The Japanese legal system has never developed procedural and remedial
incentives to litigation to the extent that they exist in the United States.
One principal procedural deterrent to complex litigation in Japan is the
long delay in proceeding. Unlike trials in the United States which, once
started, proceed continuously until completed, trials in Japan are marked
by intervals of a month or more between days of hearing. While the purpose is to encourage the parties to reach a resolution through compromise, the result is that the judges have no incentive to expedite a trial.
Instead, they prefer to delay and to wait for the parties to settle the
163. Applying strict liability to manufacturing cases was also the intention of the
drafters of section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts. George L. Priest, Strict
Product Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2308, 2313 (1989).
164. See id. at 2326 (indicating that "[section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and its comments] provided no definitive guidance as to sensible standards for
design defects").
165. HUBER, supra note 73, at 167-69. ("Not all consumers are alike; the prescription that is needlessly unsafe for one may save the life of another. In all but the
simplest cases, accidents originate not in defective deigns but in the unwise conjunction of particular design with a particular use and user.")
166. Sugarman, supra note 144, at 567.
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In other words, dispute resolution through litigation is less effective
in Japan than in the U.S. due both to weaknesses in the Japanese legal
system and also theJapanese people's negative opinion of litigation. 16 8
Thus, the deterrent effect of lawsuits is less than that in the U.S.
Professor Sugarman also notes that some wrongdoers intentionally
breach the safety requirements of tort law; tort law, therefore, is useless
as a deterrent to these wrongdoers.' 6 9 As he points out, "real fly-bynights are tempted to act dangerously even with tort law; indeed, they
1 70
have little incentive to carry liability insurance."
The Japanese drafts will not deter unestablished firms. Fly-bynights are not large companies but are normally small-to-medium com167. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 38-39 (footnote omitted). An example of
this procedural deterrent can be seen in the Thalidomide cases which were first filed
in November 1964. The hearings continued at intervals until December 1974 when
an out-of-court settlement finally was reached. Id. at 39.
It is not extremely uncommon for civil cases to drag on for several years
....

Parties ...

will not be back in the courtroom more often than one day

each month until judgment ....
While there are probably many reasons for delay, it has been suggested
that one factor may be judicial hesitancy to attribute clear-cut victory and
defeat to the respective parties. After all, Japanese judges, as creatures of
their society, are interested in harmony and compromise. It is a fact, that a
drawn-out, piecemeal trial allows the parties' emotions to cool and give an
opportunity for private settlement of the dispute.
Although the population has more than tripled since the Meiji Era [18681912], the total number of judges has not increased much in Japan. The
caseload of each judge is quite heavy by Western standards. Many cite this
situation as another significant cause of delay in the disposition of cases
before courts.
Thomson, supra note 102, at 35.
168. Professor Ramseyer indicates that a shortage of judges also contributes to
delays of the Japanese judicial proceeding. Ramseyer, supra note 110, at 633-34, 634
n.180. He says "during the 1970s a typical federal district judge had a caseload of
325 cases, a typical California superior court judge had a caseload of 964 cases, and a
typical Japanese trial court judge had a caseload of 1708 cases." Id. at 634 n.180.
Professor Tanaka indicates that the shortage of attorneys in Japan also hampers
the preservation ofjustice as follows:
Given the very limited availability of the legal services provided by lawyers,
the effective administration of justice may be seriously hampered in rural
areas, with little prospect of improvement in the provision of legal protection
to the rural population. As a matter of fact, it has been pointed out that
because of the very limited availability (in some cases, total absence) of lawyers, some summary courts and branches of district courts are having difficulties in docketing hearings and trials or in appointirig state assigned counsels
for the accused. Thus the lack of lawyers poses a serious problem for an
effective and fair administration ofjustice. The situation, therefore, calls for
urgent measures ....

Hideo Tanaka, Jittei Hffgaku A5zinyon [Introduction to the Study of Positive Law], in THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1974), supra note 104, at 268 (footnote omitted).

169. Sugarman, supra note 144, at 570.
170. Id.
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panies. In Japan, there are many small-to-medium companies. 711 Since
many small-to-medium companies have not yet considered the effects of
the proposed product liability statute,1 72 the probability that they do not
have insurance may be great.
It might be argued that small-to-medium companies should be
excused from a strict products liability law due to harshness. 173 This
argument, however, eviscerates the deterrent objective of tort law.
C.

Anti-competitiveness and Anti-innovation

The proposed drafts for a strict products liability law in Japan are also
anti-competitive as well as anti-innovative. Since this drawback is generally recognized in the U.S., 1 74 tort reform has progressed in many
states.175
Many companies in the U.S. reportedly withdrew products from the
market to avoid becoming involved in lawsuits even though they did not
believe that their products were unreasonably dangerous. 176 "A recent
survey of chief executive officers by the Conference Board... showed
that uncertainty over potential liability had led almost fifty percent to
discontinue product lines and nearly forty percent to withhold new
products."' 7 7 For example, a major manufacturer of a vaccine decided
171. Since there are many such small businesses in Japan, MITI is reluctant to
adopt strict products liability. Concerning the adoption of a strict-liability statute,
MITI showed reservation by stating that "damages caused by the enforcement of
such a law would be too large for small businesses." See infra note 195.
172. The Japan branch of AIU Insurance Co. of the United States, recently
conducted a survey ....
...showing that while manufacturers are aware of plans for product liability legislation, they are not yet seriously thinking of taking any concrete measures ....

The survey was targeted at 10,000 small- and medium-size manufacturers
(with annual sales ranging from 100 million to one billion yen) in various
industries) ....
Asked if they had made a serious attempt to study the proposed product
liability legislation... [o]nly 25% of respondents had taken any special measures in preparation for the proposed legislation ....
COMLINE 8/9/90, supra note 9.
173. Kamiyama, supra note 57, at 32. This idea that those companies without
enough money must be excused from the proposed law reflects the "deep pocket

theory" or "having large corporations become the insurers of their products." If
compensation rather than deterrence is the purpose of the proposed law, however, a

social security system is preferable as it would avoid the proposed law's large transaction costs. See supra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Cortese &Blaner, supra note 118, at 167-205;

HUBER,

supra note 73;

supra note 73.
175. "Reacting to what many see as 'crises' brought on by courts extending liability too far, state legislatures have enacted breathtakingly large numbers of changes in
product liability law, ranging from the trivial to the drastic to the draconian." Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 480 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 581.
WORKING GROUP,

177. American International Group, The Liability Lottery:

June 15, 1989, at A4.

We

All Lose,

WALL

ST.J.,
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to withdraw its products from the market because of "skyrocketing and
unpredictable tort liability."' 7 8 Although strict liability may have been
intended to discourage the sales of hazardous goods, it has also raised
the prices of goods and decreased the availability of many goods.' 7 9
Strict liability also discourages innovation.18 0 This is because,
under the strict liability regime, technology rather than human fault is
subject to torts.1 8 1 Laypersons decide whether a technology is defective, but they tend to put the standards of technological legitimacy on
"age, familiarity, and ubiquity ....[I]nnovative and unfamiliar [technology] . . . is most likely to be condemned."' 8 2 As to the warnings

required under the strict liability law, "[h]oning a warning to a fine point
of perfection requires years of market and litigation experience ....
while innovative challengers are vulnerable." 1 8 3 In addition, the availability of reasonably priced insurance depends on the accumulation of
actuarial experience-something that all established technologies have
18 4
but no truly innovative one ever does.
178. Sugarman, supra note 144, at 582 n.l 15.
Because of the [tort liability] tax ....[y]ou cannot buy several contraceptives
certified to be safe and effective by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
even though available substitutes are more dangerous or less effective. If you
have the stomach upset known as hyperemesis, you cannot buy the pill that is
certified as safe and effective against it. The tax has orphaned various drugs
that are invaluable for treating rare but serious diseases.
Because of the tax ....[y]ou cannot buy an American Motors 'CJ'Jeep or a
set of construction plans for novel airplanes from Burt Rutan, the pioneering
designer of Voyager. You can no longer buy many American-made brands of
sporting goods, especially equipment for amateur contact sports such as
hockey and lacrosse.
HUBER,

supra note 73, at 3-4.

179. See HUBER, supra 73, at 3-4. For anticompetitive effects because of withdrawn
American products, see Cortese & Blaner, supra note 118, at 188-89. See also id. at
199-201 (examples of withdrawn products).
180. For example, "[a] major U.S. manufacturer has disclosed it dropped plans to
market a promising new insulation, not because it posed a safety problems, but
because as a substitute for asbestos, it could inevitably attract speculative lawsuits."
American International Group, supra note 177.

181.

HUBER,

supra note 73, at 14.

The negligence standard had inquired whether the technologist-the human
actor on the scene-was careful, prudently trained, and properly supervised.
Who is most likely to pass a negligence test? The best and the brightest-the
technologists working at the leading edge of their professions. It is at the
frontiers of science, after all, that the best engineers, pharmacologists, doctors, and chemists typically congregate. Under the new legal standards, however, the people themselves, and their good care, good training, and good
faith, were quite irrelevant. The new inquest concerned the product itself
and its alleged defects. Where once human conduct had been its focus, the
tort system now placed technology itself in the dock.
Id. at 157.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. For the difficulty of obtaining insurance for innovative products, see Cortese
& Blaner, supra note 118, at 190.
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Under a strict products liability regime, "in the very markets where
the legal pursuit was the most intense-on the trail of exotic drugs, contraceptives, pesticides, small planes and cars, hazardous waste disposal,
86
5
and medical procedures" l -innovation stops.1
Theoretically, strict product liability was supposed to impose
"sharper liability [which] would spur more innovation . . . [, but] the
facts [are] otherwise .... [T]he accepted theories were wrong." 18 7 The
prerequisite for the theory is:
a fine-tuned and highly predictable legal process which consistently disfavors more dangerous products and favored safer ones. The success of the
new liability engine thus depended on great precision in the courts. But
the legal assembly line relied on unskilled workers, heavily pressed for
time and with many extraneous factors - sympathy for victim most especially - 18on8 their minds. This introduced a great uncertainty into the
system.
As a result, "the modern rule[s] [of strict product liability] do not deter
risk: they deter behavior that gets people sued, which is not at all the
1 89
same thing."
Because of this anti-innovative effect of strict product liability law in
the U.S., Japanese manufacturing companies do not usually export innovative products. Innovative products are vulnerable to legal attack
because it is easy to second-guess the possibility of substitute designs or

warnings. 190
D.

Problems Raised by Ministry of International Trade and
Industries

A representative of MITI's consumer protection division expressed the

following views regarding the strict products liability statute:
-A law would raise product prices as companies are forced to adopt additional safe measures.
-No consensus is evident among consumers as to what priority safety
should be given over cost.
-Many cases are settled out of court, indicating that existing consumer
protection is enough.
185. HUBER, supra note 73, at 155.
186. See id. For example, "the United States, a leader in contraceptive research
and marketing well into the early 1960s has today lost its edge and its hunger for
progress." Id.
For examples of products not introduced because of product liability, see Cortese
& Blaner, supra note 118, at 201-02.

187.

HUBER,

supra note 73, at 156.

188. Id. at 156-57.
189. Id. at 164.
190. See WORKING GROUP, supra note 73, at 31-32 (The "tort system... increasingly imposes liability upon persons and companies that have done nothing wrong. This has
been accomplished . . . by engaging in after-the-fact analyses that 'find' fault wherever
there has been an injury." (emphasis added)).
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-Damages to be caused
by the enforcement of a law would be too large for
19 1
small businesses.
The Japanese must consider these points before enacting the proposed product liability statute. First, the statute would increase the
prices of goods because manufacturers would spread risk by adding the
price of insurance on their products. Thus, consumers would be forced
to buy higher priced products,19 2 and Japanese goods would be less
competitive abroad.
Second, the Japanese must consider whether the existing consumer
protection suffices. The fact that many cases are settled out of court may
support this proposition. It may also indicate that Japanese people do
not use the current litigation system both because of the non-litigious
Japanese mentality and the ineffectiveness of the system, 193 not because
people are satisfied with the compensation available through the current
litigation system. If so, a compensation system that does not rely on
litigation may be better able to compensate injured consumers.
The Japanese must consider the traditional Japanese sense of fairness when making legal reform. The foremost problem of adopting a
strict products liability system in Japan is that the proposed system is not
culturally appropriate for Japan. The proposed reforms contravene the
traditional Japanese sense of fairness' 94 because manufacturers who
were not morally blame-worthy would be labeled "liable."
Third, the Japanese must consider the effects of strict products liability law on their integrated economy. While the largerJapanese industries may be able to absorb the increased costs of such a law, the smaller
Japanese companies-upon whose products the large companies
depend-could not.1 9 5 It would be extremely difficult to determine
which companies should bear the increased costs of strict products liability, and it is questionable whether an adequate consumer compensation system could be developed when all companies do not share the
expense.
The proposed drafts would not provide an equitable redistribution.
Although it would be paid for through a general increase in product
prices, the amount an injured person can recover would be based on
unrelated factors such as the skill of that person's attorney' 9 6 and the
191. NIKKEI 12/22/90, supra note 1 (Statements of Professor Yasuhumi Ozawa).
192. Jurisuto no me [Viewpoints ofJurists],432 JURxsUTro 14, 24 (1969).

193. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
194. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 31-42; NIHON BUNKA KAIGi HEN, GENDAI
NIHONJIN No HoISHIKI [THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

OF THE MODERN JAPANESE]

(1982).
195.

For the protection of small to medium businesses in Japan, see Lawrence

Repeta, The Small & Medium Enterprise Domain Protection Law of 1977: Its Operation &
Liability Effect, 10 LAW INJAPAN 140 (1977).
196. HUBER, supra note 73, at 13-14.
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wages the injured party earned prior to the accident. 19 7 Injured persons
would not always receive satisfactory benefits under a products liability
statute because there is a "lottery" factor; some receive a lot, others
receive nothing.
V.

The Third Way: No-fault Compensation System

Although the drafts of the proposed strict product liability law contain
many drawbacks, current Japanese law, which is primarily based upon a
negligence theory, also has disadvantages because the plaintiff's burden
of proof is difficult to meet.
This Note will argue that it is worth examining an alternative compensation scheme, such as the system currently used in New Zealand.
A.

The New Zealand System'

98

Under the New Zealand Accident Compensation System,' 9 9 those who
suffer injuries or death caused by accidents can receive compensation
without a showing of fault. 200 They receive compensation from a
national compensation fund 20 but are prohibited from bringing per20 2
sonal injury or death actions.
The national compensation fund for employee injuries and deaths
is maintained by levies upon employers and the self-employed. 20 3 The
compensation fund for car accident injuries and deaths is levied from car
owners. 20 4 Government resources cover injuries suffered by non-earners or by people who are not involved in car accidents.
Workers' compensation is provided under Sections 52 to 71 of the
Accident Compensation Act, which generously allows compensation for
lost earnings until retirement age. 20 5 Medical expenses exceeding
20 6
social security coverage are covered by the compensation system,
which also covers dental treatment 20 7 and other damages. 20 8 Covered
197. This is because compensation would be determined in part by lost wages, so a
person who had earned high wages prior to an accident would recover more than a
lower paid individual. See Sugarman, supra note 144, at 594.
198. The details of this system are described in GEOFFREY PALMER, ACCIDENT
COMPENSATION: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND
AUSTRALIA (1979), and in James A. Henderson, The New ZealandAccident Compensation

Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 781-798, 801 (1981).
199. Accident Compensation Act 1982, N.Z. Stat. No. 181, Vol. 3, 1552 and its
subsequent amendments [hereinafter Accident Compensation Act].
200. Accident Compensation Act, supra note 199, § 26.
201. Id. §§ 72-77.
202. Id. § 27. Under section 27, "[w]here any person suffers personal injury by

accident in New Zealand... no proceedings for damages arising ... out of the injury
... shall be brought in any court." Id.
203. Id. §§ 38-46.
204. Id. §§ 47-48.
205. Id. § 66.
206. Id. § 75 (l)(b).
207. Id. § 76.

208. Id. § 77.
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non-economic losses include loss of bodily function 20 9 and pain and suffering. 2 10 The system also provides rehabilitation 21 ' and personal
21 2
attendants.
The Accident Compensation Corporation, a governmental entity,
administers the Accident Compensation Act. 21 3 When a claim for compensation is denied, the claimant has a right to appeal the decision and
21 4
to obtain judicial review.
B.

The New Zealand System is Better than the Current Japanese Law

The New Zealand system is preferable to the current Japanese law
because under the Japanese system some injured persons do not receive
sufficient compensation. While Japan does currently have many compensation systems, like workers' compensation 2 15 and strict liability for
defects in fixed structures on land, 216 and special statutes for certain
accidents, such as the Automobile Accident Indemnification Guarantee
Act, 2 1 7 Consumer Products Safety Act, 21 8 and Drug Side Effects Injuries
Relief Fund Act, 2 19 some injured persons are not compensated by this
patch-work of special statutes. For example, assume that a consumer is
injured because of a defective electric appliance which has a "S.G."
(Safety Good) mark. Under the Consumer Products Safety Act, a S.G.
mark is given to those products that passed the safety standards prepared by the Association for Product Safety. 220 Injuries caused by products bearing the S.G. mark will be compensated by the Association, but
this is done only when the Association determines that "the manufacturer is 'legally liable' for compensation." '2 2' Thus, this system is not a
valuable alternative to litigation. 22 2 Moreover, only about seventy-six
products bear the S.G. mark. 2 23 Thus, some injured consumers must
209. Id. § 78.
210. Id. § 79.
211. Id. §§ 36, 37.
212. Id. §§ 80(2)(b), (3).
213. Id. §§ 4-10.
214. PALMER, supra note 198, at 400-02.
215. See generally Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.07[2] (explaining Japanese workers'
compensation); Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 335-36.
216. CIvIL CODE OF JAPAN, supra note 15, art. 717. For the English translation of

Article 717, see CIVIL CODE OFJAPAN, supra note 15, at 151. See also Kitagawa, supra
note 18, § 4.07[5] (explaining Article 717).
217. Law No. 97, 1955. For the contents of the Act, see Kitagawa, supra note 18,
§ 4.07[4].
218. Law No. 31, 1973. For the contents of the act, see Kitagawa, supra note 18,
§ 4.08[1]-[2].
219. Law No. 55, 1979. For the contents of the act, see Kitagawa, supra note 18,
§ 4.08[1], [3]; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 336-37.
220. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.08[2]. See also Kamiyama, supra note 103, at 27.
221. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.08[2]; Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 336.
222. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.08[2]. For the criticism against S.G. mark, see
also Kamiyama, supra note 57, at 27.
223. Kitagawa, supra note 18, § 4.08[2].
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rely on conventional negligence tort/litigation system under Article 709
of the Civil Code.
Under the New Zealand system, however, all persons injured can be
compensated, except people injured through illness. 224 Thus, the New
Zealand system is better than the current system of negligence lawsuits
and the limited patch-work special statutes. Of course, the fact that the
New Zealand system does not cover illness is problematic. Nonetheless,
the New Zealand system more effectively compensates victims than the
current Japanese laws.
C. The New Zealand System Is Suitable for Japanese Goals & Society
Although abolition of tort law and the right to sue would contravene an
American's traditional sense of fairness, 2 25 the Japanese would react
differently.
Japanese people do not regard highly the right to sue. 22 6 On the
contrary, they try to avoid lawsuits as much as possible. 22 7 They
strongly dislike litigation and overwhelmingly favor alternative dispute
resolution methods such as c5mutei (extra-judicial dispute resolution) or
2 28
private or official negotiations among parties.
In addition, the transaction cost is lower under the New Zealand
system because litigation is not used. Moreover, the New Zealand system does not have the anti-competitive drawbacks of the strict liability
system.
However, the New Zealand system may not achieve deterrence
because it provides no incentive to cease the distribution of defective
products. 2 29 As a solution to this problem, Professor Henderson has
224. The New Zealand compensation system does not cover illness not caused by
accident. PALMER, supra note 198, at 249-70.
225. Professor Henderson is concerned about the abolition of the right to sue in
tort in the United States though he admitted the lack of fairness in the current American tort system. Henderson, supra note 198, at 797-98. He states:
[Though the tort system is not perfect,] the tort system creates the appearance, at least, of trying to reach individualized results that are fair to all concerned .... Moving from a properly functioning common law tort system to a
system like that in New Zealand might cause many citizens to feel that traditional commitments to fairness had been compromised or even abandoned
.... Although more victims of misfortune would be receiving benefits under
the new regime, I would not be surprised to discover a general feeling in the
community that fairness to the individual had been sacrificed in the name of
the greatest good for the greatest number.
Id. at 797-98.
226. NIHON BUNKA KAIGi HEN, supra note 194, at 103-06.
227. Id.
228. A poll regarding the legal consciousness of the Japanese conducted in 1976
showed that 84%o favored "ch5utei" or other private or official negotiations rather
than litigation. Id.
229. Of course this lack of deterrence can be substituted by other methods such as
safety regulation or gyisei-shid6 [administrative guidance]. For an explanation of
gysei-shid6, see Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 39 n.56.
As to the deterrent effect of torts litigation, it seems that the Japanese legal system
has not played such an important role as the American one because the Japanese
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proposed a system that requires manufacturers to contribute to the compensation fund in proportion to the risk created by those manufacturers. 2 30 He states:
If the amount contributed to is appropriate, the proper balance between
safe and risky activities will be achieved. The tort system consciously aims
at attaching the appropriate price tags on risky conduct, but there is no
reason in theory why a23system providing universal compensation could
not do the same thing. '
To solve the deterrence problem under a New Zealand-type system,
Japan should also consider imposing fines on manufacturers who distribute defective products and cause injuries. These fines may be allocated to the accident compensation fund. The government agency
decision to impose fines must be based on evidence of fault and causation, and such evidence must be proved so that drawbacks (such as discouragement of innovation) would not occur.
In addition, it might be better to lessen the degree of proof
required under the current Japanese law. In the area of manufacturing
defects, the element of negligence might better be replaced by the concept of defects because: (1) the standard for determining defects can be
more easily applied in manufacturing cases than in design defect and
failure to warn cases, 23 2 and (2) sometimes the proof of negligence
beyond a reasonable doubt 23 3 is very difficult to determine, even by
those specialized agencies. In cases where negligence could not be
proved, the result would be that the companies would not be required to
contribute to the fund and, hence, would have no incentive to increase
safety. In other words, the goal is to balance the necessities of giving
incentives to manufacturing companies to invest more on product safety
and incentive to continue manufacturing useful goods at reasonable
prices.
It may be argued that risk allocation through fines might be costly,
thereby taking away the advantages of low transaction costs under the
New Zealand system. Nevertheless, the cost under the New Zealand
regime would be lower than under the strict liability regime proposed by
the Japanese drafts. Under the New Zealand system, a specialized government agency can professionally determine the defects, causation,
etc., more efficiently than courts. Because courts are not specialized,
they need to be educated 2 34 in the facts of each case. Under the New
Zealand system, specialized agencies deal with specific areas and do not
people have not relied so much on litigation as on a method of dispute resolution.

Given these characteristics of the Japanese legal system, deterrence through administrative regulations and guidance is more desirable than litigation.
230. Henderson, supra note 198, at 795.
231. Id.
232. See supra section IV.B.
233. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
234. This is true even though judges may become more experienced as they preside over more product liability trials.
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need to be reeducated for each case. Thus, the cost of determining fines
under the New Zealand system is lower than it would be under the strict
liability litigation system.
In addition, Japanese people favor decisions made by okami (administrative agencies) over decisions obtained by individual lawsuits. This is
partially because traditionally the government, without relying on lawsuits brought by private persons, has exclusive control of remedies to
protect public health and welfare in the civil law countries. 235 Also, the
Japanese respect governmental decisions, motivated by public interest,
more than the private-interest-oriented litigation decisions. 23 6
Conclusion
Current Japanese tort law is insufficient to meet injured plaintiffs' needs
in product liability suits. The proposed drafts of strict liability would
compensate the injured better than current law. Nonetheless, the drafts
have many drawbacks. Even though discussion regarding the drafts
seems limited to an "all-or-nothing" choice between adopting the drafts
or retaining the status quo, Japan should consider a third option resembling the New Zealand system.
Of course there are some criticisms against the New Zealand system. For example, some argue that without tort law manufacturers will
not be deterred from producing defective products. This drawback,
however, may be remedied by strengthening the power of government
23 7
agencies, which traditionally have had strong power in Japan.
Although "gyousei-shidou" or administrative guidance is achieved
neither by ruling nor by adjudication but by "suggestion," 23 8 all private
235. In the United State private actions by persons actually injured often complement government sanctions .... Many statutes in the United States
encourage private individuals to police matters by permitting large damage
awards if a violation is found. The civil law, however, views intervention in areas
that requireprotection of thepublic as the exclusivefunction of the government. Injapan
this attitude is illustrated by the antimonopoly law which, although modeled
on the United States antitrust law, contains no provisions for treble damages
and by regulatory statutes such as the Act for the Prevention of Air Pollution ....
The principal method used by these laws to deal with unsafe products is to
grant the government the power to stop all sales of a product which is alleged
to be unsafe until the manufacturer can prove that it is safe ....
[T]hegenerally
widespreaduse of exclusive governmentalremedies... affects public attitudes in all areas
of the law.
Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 40-41 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
236. See generally, NIHON BUNiA KAIGI HEN, supra note 194, at 103-06, 112-14.
The following excerpt shows that the Japanese like to solve disputes by relying on
their superiors rather than by relying on individual rights gained under lawsuits.
Exceptionally, the victim may seek reparation from the author of his loss, but
even in this case he does not want to go to court. He resorts rather to the authority of
some person such as a notable in the community or a police officer who has
influence over the person who has injured him.
NODA, supra note 17, at 182 (emphasis added).
237. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 39 n.56, 40.
238. Id. at 39 n.56. See also Cohen & Martin, supra note 5, at 319 n.18 (explaining
briefly "administrative guidance").
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industries follow such suggestions. 239 In addition, Japanese people
favor this government-led method over private-interest-motivated litigation. Thus, safety control of manufactured goods can be achieved
through administrative guidance.
There may be other criticisms of the New Zealand system. Nonetheless, it is worth considering or starting to analyze the use of this idea,
even if a complete adoption of the system might be inappropriate for
Japan.
In fact, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is
reportedly 240 considering the use of a compensation fund instead of
product liability law. It is not clear whether MITI's plan is similar to the
New Zealand system, which would abolish tort lawsuits. Although it may
take some time before the drafts or other options become effective,
Japan must not forget that strict liability law as proposed by the drafts
has many drawbacks and that there is a possible alternative, the New
Zealand system, which may be more suitable to the Japanese culture and
people.
Susumu Hirano*

239. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 11, at 39 n.56, 40. Professor Tanaka states:

"The fact that administrative guidance ... can work fairly effectively may well be

founded upon the Japanese reluctance to insist upon their legal rights." Tanaka,
supra note 168, at 311.

240.

NIKKEI

12/22/90, supra note 1. The newspaper states:

[MITI], though studying the possibility of a product liability law, appears to

. . . "A law is not urgently needed.", said Ozasa
[MITI's Consumer Protection Division]. "What we're considering instead is

have strong reservations

setting up some kind of a system outside of a product liability law to compensate consumers for the loss caused by defective goods." He cited the possibility of establishing some kind of compensation fund.
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